We utilise the Australian 'comply T his paper focuses on the 'comply or explain' (COE) regime in Australia, where firms can either comply with 'best practice' corporate governance or explain why they do not. The Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council (ASX CGC) issued revised guidance in 2014 that an explanation for non-compliance should be reasonably detailed and informative. It emphasises that firms should disclose what, if any, alternative corporate governance mechanisms may have been adopted in lieu of the recommendations (ASX CGC 2014). Companies are also cautioned against brief statements such as 'the recommendation is not considered appropriate, given the entity's size and circumstances' or 'the board as a whole performs the role that such a committee would ordinarily undertake' (ASX CGC 2014). We examine whether firms that chose not to have an audit committee were using the 'explain' part of the regime as a pretext to avoid best practice.
T his paper focuses on the 'comply or explain' (COE) regime in Australia, where firms can either comply with 'best practice' corporate governance or explain why they do not. The Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council (ASX CGC) issued revised guidance in 2014 that an explanation for non-compliance should be reasonably detailed and informative. It emphasises that firms should disclose what, if any, alternative corporate governance mechanisms may have been adopted in lieu of the recommendations (ASX CGC 2014) . Companies are also cautioned against brief statements such as 'the recommendation is not considered appropriate, given the entity's size and circumstances' or 'the board as a whole performs the role that such a committee would ordinarily undertake' (ASX CGC 2014). We examine whether firms that chose not to have an audit committee were using the 'explain' part of the regime as a pretext to avoid best practice.
Our sample is based on Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed firms covered by the SIRCA corporate governance database. We then exclude the largest 500 firms as they are required to have an audit committee by ASX Listing Rules. This results in a sample of 317 firms which can either choose to comply by having an audit committee or explain why they do not, with 130 having no audit committee. We conduct our analysis using data from a single year (2011) to avoid econometric issues of using 'sticky' variables of interest. We choose 2011 because the ASX CGC (2010) guidance is in force, but it is before there are any effects of the revised 2014 guidance. Thus our results provide evidence on whether the revised ASX CGC (2014) guidance on disclosing the reasons for not following a recommendation is necessary and more helpful to shareholders than the previous version, ASX CGC (2010) , in understanding why a firm has chosen not to follow the recommended best practice.
We focus on audit committees as they play a vital role in the financial reporting process. First, although there is a substantial body of literature that examines what firm characteristics are associated with having an audit committee within an agency framework of supply and demand factors (e.g., Pincus et al. 1989; Bradbury 1990; Collier 1993; Menon and Williams 1994; Collier and Gregory 1999; Beasley and Salterio 2001; Rainsbury et al. 2008; Chen et al. 2009 ), samples of voluntary adopters are weighted towards the benefits. We argue that it is important to also consider why firms choose not to have an audit committee in a COE regime. Accordingly, we provide descriptive evidence of the explanations given by firms in the annual reports for not having an audit committee. The most common explanation we find is that 'the firm size does not justify an audit committee' followed by 'the board size does not justify an audit committee' and 'the firm is not complex enough to justify an audit committee' . Our results also suggest that firms deviate from corporate governance 'best practice' due to mainly internal factors affecting their ability to supply an audit committee, rather than a lack of external demand for higher-quality governance (Hay et al. 2017) .
Second, we examine the firm characteristics associated with COE explanations for audit committee noncompliance. That is, we examine whether firm characteristics relate to the COE explanations provided. The results show that the use of firm size, board size and complexity explanations are associated with lower total assets, smaller boards and less complexity in financial affairs as measured by leverage, respectively. Our findings, that the explanations provided are consistent with firm characteristics, support the view that such firms are less able to comply with best practice corporate governance (Coles et al. 2008) , and firms are not using explanations as pretexts to avoid corporate governance best practice. We also find that explanation use is associated with Big 4 auditor use, firm performance and net cash flow from operations.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. It differs from prior literature on the formation of audit committees by investigating firms that have chosen not to follow best practice, rather than firms that have a voluntary audit committee. Despite the sizable literature on audit committees, as suggested by the revised ASX CGC (2014) guidance, regulators are more likely to be interested in non-compliance (i.e., interested in why firms do not observe best practice audit committee guidelines). ICAEW (2013) notes that COE regimes only work effectively when there is trust. However, trust in the absence of evidence may be misplaced. Anecdotal evidence has noted that the quality of explanations has been problematic (FRC 2012) . Companies are also cautioned against brief statements in the most recent version of ASX CGC (2014). Thus we extend the literature by documenting explanation details and linking these directly to related firm characteristics. By providing descriptive evidence on firm-provided rationales for not having audit committees, we find that supply-driven rationales, such as firm and board size, are the most important reasons for not having an audit committee. As our results also show that these explanations are related to underlying firm characteristics, we conclude that the explanations are justified, and the concerns that explanations are used as pretexts to avoid corporate governance best practice may be overstated. Allowing firms a choice in whether to comply or explain is consistent with a 'one size does not fit all' approach to corporate governance.
Our results also contrast with the revised ASX CGC (2014) guidance as we find brief statements, especially descriptive statements regarding entity size, board size and complexity, are informative and understandable to shareholders as they are related to underlying firm characteristics. The exception is that firms may need to provide more details to better elucidate the cost-benefit trade-offs (efficiency-based) explanation, which is a less descriptive explanation. Thus our results may be useful to regulators in terms of whether the updated guidance on explanations was necessary or adequate.
Background and Literature Review

Institutional setting
In the aftermath of corporate failures associated with accounting scandals such as One.Tel, Harris Scarfe and HIH, Australia strengthened its regulatory and corporate governance framework for companies. The ASX CGC was formed in August 2002, with the aim to provide a practical principles-based guide to corporate governance for both firms and users of financial information.
1 Both the ASX CGC and other regulatory changes were designed to improve the quality of financial reporting and increase disclosure requirements, reflecting a desire not to be left behind by regulatory reform in other jurisdictions (Robins 2006 2 The ASX CGC (2010) describes eight broad principles: lay solid foundations for management and oversight; structure the board to add value; promote ethical and responsible decision making; safeguard integrity in financial reporting; make timely and balanced disclosure; respect the rights of shareholders; recognise and manage risk; and remunerate fairly and responsibly. Each principle is followed by more precise recommendations and each recommendation is also explained in greater detail, including the underlying intent. Munro and Buckby (2008) summarise the changes in Australian audit committee regulation from 1976 to 2004 and conclude that compliance has increased for the largest firms. However, Psaros and Seamer (2004) present contrary evidence for 1998-2001. There is also a significant increase in audit committee independence after the second edition (Matolcsy et al. 2011) .
Under ASX listing rule 4.10.3, firms must disclose in their annual report that they have either followed the ASX CGC recommendations or their reasons for not doing so. This COE regime is colloquially called the 'if not, why not?' approach. Zadkovich (2007) categorises the Australian corporate governance regime as a hybrid of mandatory and voluntary rules. If firms neither comply nor explain, they may be removed from the official list. 3 Prior research suggests that auditors do not raise concerns about poor explanation quality in the UK (Shrives and Brennan 2015) . Thus we do not focus on the role of auditors in this study, although we control for their effect.
The ASX CGC (2003) states that best practices are not prescriptions but rather guidelines designed to produce an efficient or quality outcome. The COE regime is utilised, as the ASX recognises that 'one size fits all' in terms of corporate governance may not be helpful, and states that factors such as firm size, performance and effectiveness may affect the adoption of corporate governance recommendations (ASX CGC 2003) . In addition, the third edition mentions that firm complexity, history and corporate culture may also affect the adoption of corporate governance recommendations (ASX CGC 2014).
The ASX CGC (2010) advises firms to explain why they have not followed each recommendation, and how this accords with the spirit of the relevant principle. Revised guidance was given in the third edition that an explanation for non-compliance should be reasonably detailed and informative. It emphasises that firms should disclose what, if any, alternative corporate governance practices may have been adopted in lieu of the recommendations (ASX CGC 2014). Companies are also cautioned against brief statements such as 'the recommendation is not considered appropriate, given the entity's size and circumstances' or the 'the board as a whole performs the role that such a committee would ordinarily undertake ' (ASX CGC 2014) . This indicates that the regulators had concerns about the adequacy of the justification for 'if not' explanations at the time of our study.
Our study focuses on the recommendation that the board of a listed entity should have an audit committee.
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This is Recommendation 4.1, sitting under Principle 4: Safeguard integrity in financial reporting. In the commentary to this recommendation, it is noted that an audit committee may be less appropriate for companies with a smaller board (ASX CGC 2010). Recommendation 4.2 requires that the audit committee consists only of non-executive directors, a majority of independent directors, an independent chair who is not the chair of the board, and at least three members (ASX CGC 2010). In addition, ASX Listing Rule 12.7 requires companies in the S&P All Ordinaries Index (the largest 500 companies on the ASX) to have an audit committee. Thus our study is naturally focused on smaller firms that must balance supply and demand factors when deciding whether to have an audit committee or not (Chen et al. 2009 ).
Audit committee formation
Prior literature documents the importance of audit committees in the financial reporting process (e.g., MartinovBennie et al. 2015) . For example, audit committees facilitate the timely release of accounting information, thus alleviating information asymmetry (Klein 1998) . Audit committee independence and meeting frequency are associated with a lower cost of debt (Anderson et al. 2004 ) and fewer accounting restatements (Abbott et al. 2004) . Audit committee financial expertise and meeting frequency is associated with conservatism (Sultana 2015) and financial expertise is also associated with less earnings manipulation (Bedard et al. 2004) . Audit committees can also positively impact the reporting of non-financial information, including corporate social responsibility information (Appuhami and Tashakor 2017) .
Audit committees may be demanded because they enhance the independence of the external audit, internal controls and the credibility of financial statements (Krishnamoorthy et al. 2002) . First, financial statements are used as a monitoring device to mitigate agency costs between shareholders and management when there is distributed ownership. Thus, firms with more distributed ownership (less ownership concentration) will place greater importance on financial statements, and are therefore more likely to have an audit committee (Bradbury 1990) .
5 Alternatively, substantial shareholders may be better positioned to access private information for monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) , and will be less reliant on financial statements. Audit committees are also demanded more by firms with higher agency costs related to debt. As debt covenants are often based on accounting numbers, firms have incentives to reduce agency costs by increasing the quality of accounting and financial statements (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) . Hence, firms with greater debt are more likely to employ audit committees (Pincus et al. 1989; Bradbury 1990; Rainsbury et al. 2008) . Top-tier audit firms are also more likely to encourage boards to follow industry best practice (Eichenseher and Shields 1985; Pincus et al. 1989; Bradbury 1990) . 6 Therefore, firms with a Big 4 auditor are more likely to have an audit committee. Alternatively, some firms may be less able to supply an audit committee. As the cost of committees is likely to be fixed, smaller firms with negative cash flow are less likely to be able to afford the cost of an audit committee. In addition, as establishing a separate committee requires greater individual director skills, such as financial expertise, firms with smaller boards may be less likely to have committees (Bradbury 1990; Beasley and Salterio 2001; Carson 2002 ).
Comply or explain regimes
Although there is a large body of research that examines firm compliance with governance codes and the determinants of corporate governance (see surveys by Armstrong et al. 2010; Brown et al. 2011) , relatively less attention has been paid to different ways of complying with the principles of the codes. Shrives and Brennan (2015) summarise prior studies on COE regimes, which have been conducted on UK, German and Dutch firms, and also note that disclosure of non-compliance is an under-researched area.
7 It is important to study the explanations as they provide evidence on whether firms are abusing the choice to not comply with best practice governance principles. Explanations are helpful for shareholders to understand why best practices are not followed. Salterio et al. (2013) consider COE regimes in Canada and Australia, and report the frequency with which firms comply, explain or do neither. They conclude that the overall adherence with corporate governance best practice codes is similar, but Australian firms are more likely to offer an explanation than Canadian firms and less likely to comply with the best practice recommendation. The explanation rate for Australian firms ranges from 1% (the CEO and CFO are required to state in writing that the financial statements present a true and fair view) to 55% (the Board should establish a nomination committee). Shrives and Brennan (2015) consider the location, comprehensiveness, similarity, length, complexity, specificity and attestation of explanations to noncompliance in the UK. Explanations average 87 words and have poor readability, with the majority categorised as 'more difficult' or 'harder' to read. Sixty percent of explanations are categorised as general or inadequate, although larger firms provide more specific explanations. However, neither Salterio et al. (2013) nor Shrives and Brennan (2015) consider the details of explanations provided, and whether these are supported by the firm characteristics associated with these explanations.
A study of corporate governance best practice in the UK finds that non-compliance is persistent and that serial non-compliers have higher market performance (MacNeil and Li 2006) . Hooghiemstra (2012) examines non-compliance explanations for Dutch firms, and finds a positive association between greater ownership concentration, stronger boards, lower leverage and a self-constructed measure of explanation informativeness. Hooghiemstra and van Ees (2011) categorise Dutch non-compliance explanations but do not report on the frequency of each explanation category. They find that smaller, more profitable firms with larger boards provide more explanations. However, neither Hooghiemstra (2012) nor Hooghiemstra and van Ees (2011) investigate whether the firm characteristics support the explanations provided.
Research questions
Derived from the discussion above, we consider two research questions. First we add to existing literature by providing direct evidence on the firm-supplied reasons why an audit committee has not been formed. It is important to understand, from a theoretical and regulatory perspective, why some firms choose not to follow best practice. Under a COE regime, the onus is on firms to explain why they have chosen to depart from corporate governance best practice, which may emphasise the costs of having an audit committee. We also add to the literature on COE regimes, as prior literature on COE explanations has examined the location, comprehensiveness, similarity, length, complexity, specificity and attestation of explanations (Shrives and Brennan 2015) and informativeness (Hooghiemstra 2012) . However, the nature and type of those explanations has received relatively scant attention. We argue that considering the details of the explanations provided makes an important contribution to the existing literature on COE regimes. Specifically, this provides an understanding of how companies validate departure from corporate governance best practice. Overall, considering the importance of examining both the COE regime and audit committees, we investigate the explanations provided by firms for not having an audit committee. Our first research question is:
RQ1: What are the explanations provided for not having an audit committee?
Next, we examine what firm characteristics are associated with different explanations. Specifically, after controlling for factors associated with a higher demand for an audit committee, we test whether explanations for not having an audit committee are consistent with underlying firm characteristics. This directly addresses whether the COE regime is functioning by providing unsubstantiated pretexts to claim adherence to the COE regime. Whether the regime is being misused by the provision of unrelated explanations will be of interest to regulators. We also add to the audit committee formation literature by showing whether firms' explanations are related to the underlying firm characteristics, or are unrelated pretexts to avoid having an audit committee. We state this question as: RQ2: Are explanations for not having an audit committee consistent with underlying firm characteristics?
Research Design
Sample selection
We limit our analysis to one year (2011) of data to avoid the econometric issues involved with pooling multiple years of data when the underlying corporate governance variables are 'sticky' . 8 We choose 2011 because the ASX CGC (2010) guidance is in force, but it is before there are any effects of the revised 2014 guidance. This addresses the issue of whether the additional 2014 regulations were needed. We include ASX firms domiciled in Australia, to ensure a common regulatory environment. This initially results in 871 firms covered by the SIRCA corporate governance database. As ASX Listing Rule 12.7 requires companies in the S&P All Ordinaries Index (the largest 500 companies on the ASX) to have an audit committee, we exclude the 500 observations with the largest market capitalisation. We focus on the 371 observations that have a choice in whether or not to have an audit committee. This allows us to examine the differences between firms that choose to adhere by compliance or by an explanation. We collect all corporate governance, audit and market data from SIRCA, with firm financials from Aspect Huntley. 9 We use the SIRCA corporate governance database to identify firms that do not have an audit committee, resulting in 130 firms (out of 371) that chose not to have an audit committee, and 241 firms (out of 371) that chose to have an audit committee in 2011. For each observation, we manually check this fact. Our sample selection procedures are outlined in Table 1 .
Non-compliance explanations
The COE explanations for why the firm does not have an audit committee are found in the corporate governance statement of each annual report. The explanations range from one sentence to a paragraph. Many are generic in nature. Six firms did not adhere to the COE regime as they provided no explanation for a lack of an audit committee. A further nine only made a statement that the full board (or part thereof) performs the role of the audit committee. This technically does not explain why the firm does not have an audit committee and could be considered lack of adherence to the COE regime (Salterio et al. 2013 ). Furthermore, if there is no audit committee, the full board would be required to undertake the tasks performed by the audit committee. We do not study the determinants of this statement as we do not consider it an explanation, but rather an alternative to having an audit committee.
10 Thus, the overall non-adherence rate (i.e., firms that neither comply nor explain) is 4% of our 371 sample firms. 11 We include these six firms in our tests as they are still valid observations to compare the characteristics of firms that provide an explanation type against.
In categorising the COE explanations we are guided by Krippendorff (2013) . First, we examine a random sample of 20 explanations to develop a list of key words and phrases that describe the most common types of explanations. We then analyse the sample of 130 firms that employ a COE explanation, and sort their explanations into relevant types.
12 Where there is doubt over a classification, co-authors discuss and agree upon the classification. At the end of the process a random recheck of 20% of the sample is undertaken. No errors in coding are found and all explanations fit into one or more of the explanation types. We identify and code four explanation types, as follows:
Firm Size = a binary variable equal to one where the firm explains that it is not yet of a size or scale to justify an audit committee, and zero otherwise. Board Size = a binary variable equal to one where the firm explains that the Board of Directors is not yet of an appropriate size, or the composition/structure of the Board does not warrant the establishment of an audit committee, and zero otherwise. Complexity = a binary variable equal to one where the firm explains that its current activities, stage of development or financial affairs are not of such complexity to justify the existence of an audit committee, and zero otherwise. Efficiency = a binary variable equal to one where the firm explains that it would be inefficient to establish an audit committee or that the costs would outweigh the benefits, and zero otherwise. Table 2 provides a selection of explanation types and illustrates our coding procedures. The bold and underscored words are sample key words that are used in the coding process. We also report results for whether the firm stated that the full board will perform the role of the audit committee (Full Board).
Research model
To provide insight into whether a firm's explanations for not having an audit committee are appropriately supported, we consider the firm characteristics that would best reflect each explanation category.
First, if firms use a firm size explanation (Firm Size), we expect a negative relation with firm size. Prior literature suggests a positive relationship between firm size and having an audit committee, due to economies of The Board considers that the company is not currently of a size, or its affairs of such complexity, that the formation of separate or special committees is justified at this time. The Board as a whole is able to address the governance aspects of the full scope of the company's activities and ensure that it adheres to appropriate ethical standards. In particular, the Board as a whole considers those matters would usually be the responsibility of an audit committee and a nomination committee and adheres to their respective charters. The Board considers that, at this stage, no efficiencies or other benefits would be gained by establishing a separate audit committee or a separate nomination committee.
The directors believe that it would not increase efficiency or effectiveness to have a separate audit committee, and that audit matters are of such significance that they should be considered by the full Board.
This table presents selected explanations given for non-compliance with ASX CGC (2010) recommendations 4.1 for companies to have an audit committee. Explanations are binary variables equal to one if the explanation is: that the firm is not yet of a size or scale to justify an audit committee (Firm Size); that the Board of Directors is not yet of an appropriate size or the composition/structure of the Board does not warrant the establishment of an audit committee (Board Size); that the current activities, stage of development or financial affairs are not of such complexity to justify the existence of an audit committee (Complexity); that the firm explains that it would be inefficient to establish an audit committee or that the costs would outweigh the benefits (Efficiency); that the Board (or part thereof) performs the role of the audit committee (Full Board), and zero otherwise. Some key words used in the coding process are bold and underscored.
scale in monitoring (Pincus et al. 1989 ) and a greater demand for an audit committee to offset agency costs (Carson 2002) . We measure the firm size variable as the natural logarithm of total assets (LnTA). Second, if firms use a board size explanation (Board Size), we expect a negative relation with board size. Our board size variable is the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board (LnBoard). Establishing a sub-committee can require greater specialised skills and knowledge (e.g., financial expertise). Hence, firms with smaller boards are less likely to supply an audit committee (Bradbury 1990; Beasley and Salterio 2001; Carson 2002) . 13 Third, if firms use a complexity explanation (Complexity), we expect a negative relation with debt levels. Intuitively, complexity is an ambiguous construct to measure. The introduction of debt into a capital structure greatly increases the agency costs of monitoring and bonding, which increases the complexity of financial affairs (Dang 2013) . This is distinguished from business complexity, which could arise from multiple product lines, but is not directly in the audit committees' remit. Companies explain complexity with phrases referring to their development and their financial affairs. As small companies on the ASX can be solely debt financed (Ferguson et al. 2011 ) debt levels captures both complexity of financial affairs and constraint on business development. Debt level is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets divided by total liabilities (LnTA TL).
14 Fourth, if firms use an efficiency explanation (Efficiency), we expect a negative relation with future growth options. Again we note that we are measuring not whether the business is efficient but whether it is efficient to have an audit committee. The efficiency explanations from annual reports are ambiguous and finding an appropriate proxy for firm characteristics is difficult. Firms distinguish efficiency from a size-based explanation by noting that the costs outweigh the benefits. We argue that if the wealth of the firm is mainly in off-balance sheet growth options then investors are less reliant on financial statements and it is less efficient to have an audit committee. Thus having an audit committee could be considered relatively less useful (Bradbury 1990; Deli and Gillan 2000; Klein 2002 ). We measure the relative growth options of the firm using assets-in-place (Assets Place) which we define as total assets divided by the opportunity cost of funding those assets (market capitalisation plus total liabilities).
To formally test why firms use different explanations to justify not having an audit committee, we use the following logistic regression model (firm and time subscripts omitted), where Explain is one of four types of COE explanations for why the firm does not have an audit committee (Firm Size, Board Size, Complexity and Efficiency):
Our model controls for factors that are associated with having an audit committee (Pincus et al. 1989; Bradbury 1990; Collier 1993; Carson 2002) . First, firms with more distributed ownership (less ownership concentration) will rely more on financial statements and face greater demand for an audit committee (Bradbury 1990) . 15 Alternatively, substantial shareholders may be better positioned to access private information for monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . These firms are less reliant on financial statements and will have a lower demand for an audit committee. We calculate ownership concentration as the percentage of ordinary shares owned by the largest 20 shareholders (Top20).
Second, top-tier audit firms are more likely to encourage boards to follow industry best practice (Eichenseher and Shields 1985; Pincus et al. 1989; Bradbury 1990) . Therefore, firms with a Big 4 auditor are more likely to have an audit committee or provide robust explanations. The Big4 variable is equal to one if the annual report was audited by a Big 4 firm, and zero otherwise.
Third, firms with poor market performance face a greater demand to follow corporate governance best practice (MacNeil and Li 2006) . We measure market performance (Return) as the one-year abnormal return calculated as the natural logarithmic change in price as at the 2011 balance date over the price as at the 2010 balance date, less the natural logarithmic change in the ASX All Ordinaries index over the same period. 16 Fourth, as the cost of committees is likely to be fixed, smaller firms with negative net cash flow are less likely to be able to afford the cost of an audit committee. Furthermore, firms with negative net cash flow are more likely to be in the development stage, smaller and less complex (Ferguson et al. 2011) , and are less likely to have an audit committee. We measure cash flow (CFO Dum) as a binary variable equal to one if the net cash flow from operations is positive, and zero otherwise. This suggests that the Efficiency explanation is mostly used as a complementary explanation to other explanation types. The average number of explanations a firm provides (Num Explain) is 1.720 (median is two). As the most common explanations (Firm Size and Board Size) are based on firms' ability to form an audit committee rather than a lack of demand, it suggests that firms view supply rather than demand reasons as the main rationale for not having an audit committee. This table presents descriptive statistics for the explanation types. For multiple explanations we report the frequency with which each explanation has also been classified in another type. Num Explain is the number of explanation types a firm gives as to the lack of an audit committee.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Frequency of explanations
Analysis of explanations: Univariate analysis
explanation type is used. We report t-statistics for continuous variables and Chi-square statistics for categorical variables. 17 Firm size (LnTA) is significant at the 0.01 level for the Firm Size explanation; board size is significant at the 0.01 level for the Board Size explanation, and leverage (LnTA TL) is significant at the 0.01 level for the Complexity explanation. These differences are in the hypothesised direction and are consistent with the view that the explanations provided are consistent with underlying firm characteristics. There is no support for the association between Assets Place and the Efficiency explanation.
In Panel B, we report the distribution of the variable that most closely supports each explanation type, and test whether firms using an explanation differ across quartiles relative to firms not using that explanation. Firms that provide a firm size explanation are significantly more likely to be in the smallest two quartiles for total assets, and less likely to be in the largest quartile. Firms providing a board size explanation are significantly more likely to have three directors, and less likely to have five or more directors. Firms providing a complexity explanation are significantly more likely to be in the smallest quartile for leverage, and less likely to be in the largest quartile. A higher proportion of firms providing an efficiency explanation are in quartile 1, representing the higher growth options quartile, and less in quartile 4, although these differences are not significant at conventional levels.
Thus our univariate results suggest that COE explanations relating to firm size, board size and complexity are consistent with related underlying firm characteristics. The results for the efficiency explanation are in the right direction, but not significant. Low statistical power may be the reason for this because of the low number of firms using the Efficiency explanation. The efficiency explanation is only provided by 23% of firms that do not have an audit committee. As most of these firms also provide a firm-or board size-based explanation, the efficiency explanation may be mostly used to complement other explanation types.
Analysis of explanations: Regression results
Logistic regressions are reported in Table 6 , with different explanation types as the dependent variable (N = 371). The Nagelkerke R 2 are between 9.3 and 23.7% and all models except for Model 4 (Efficiency) are significant. While multicollinearity is a common issue in corporate governance research (Brown et al. 2011) , it is unlikely to be a major issue for our sample as the highest correlation is 0.427 between LnTA and CFO Dum.
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In Model 1, firms with fewer total assets, smaller boards, lower leverage and negative net cash flow from operations are more likely to provide a firm size explanation for not having an audit committee (Firm Size). Thus firms providing a size-based explanation are smaller in terms of total assets. Furthermore, smaller firms are likely to have fewer directors and be in a development stage with negative operating cash flows (Ferguson et al. 2011) . Firm size may also constrain access to debt finance. As prior audit committee literature finds size is positively related to having an audit committee (e.g., Pincus et al. 1989; Collier 1993) , this result confirms that smaller firms are less likely to have an audit committee.
In Model 2, firms that provide a board size explanation are more likely to have smaller boards. We interpret this as consistent with firms providing the board size explanation. Firms that provide a board size explanation also have lower leverage, are less likely to use a Big 4 auditor and have a higher market return. This result is consistent with prior literature on having an audit committee. That is, board size (e.g. , Bradbury 1990; Beasley and Salterio 2001) , leverage (Pincus et al. 1989; Bradbury 1990; Rainsbury et al. 2008 ) and a Big 4 auditor (Eichenseher and Shields 1985) are associated with having an audit committee.
Model 3 provides evidence that firms using a complexity explanation have lower leverage (higher LnTA TL). Thus firms that use a complexity explanation have less complex agency relationships resulting in less complex financial affairs. Prior research documents that leverage is also associated with having an audit committee (Pincus et al. 1989; Bradbury 1990 ). Firms providing a complexity explanation also have significantly higher returns. Prior literature has argued that there is a lower demand for best practice corporate governance in highperforming firms (MacNeil and Li 2006) and unlike Models 1 and 2 board size and firm size are not significant. Thus a potential inference is that such firms have undergone rapid growth which is not captured by financial accounting, but is reflected by their market valuation. These firms are therefore explaining why they do not have an audit committee even though they are now larger in terms of market capitalisation (i.e., there are no significant differences related to total assets and board size). In Model 4, the Efficiency explanation is not significantly associated with any variables and the overall model is insignificant. First, this is likely due to the small number of firms that use this explanation type and when they do, it is mainly in conjunction with other explanation types. Second, as discussed previously, we find it is more difficult in interpreting firms' efficiency explanations and finding an appropriate proxy. Overall, we conclude that firm size, board size and complexity COE explanations are associated with related firm characteristics, providing evidence for RQ2.
Additional tests
We also include different control variables in the regressions, such as the current ratio, measures of accounting profit and the market-to-book ratio, and find they are not significant. Ownership variables are not significant for any model in Table 6 . We therefore employ the percentage of ordinary shares owned by the Board of Directors as an additional proxy for firm ownership. This produces unchanged results.
19 Controlling for whether the 2011 annual report is qualified or contains a going concern emphasis of matter, produces qualitatively similar results. 20 We do not include these variables in the main tests due to multicollinearity, and to maximise power from our sample size. We also find similar results when we run regressions on the broader sample of 871 firms, which includes firms in the S&P All Ordinaries Index that have less of a choice to have an audit committee. The results are also unchanged when we winsorise all the continuous variables to remove any bias potentially created from outliers.
Conclusions
Under a COE regime, firms can follow best practice guidelines in a corporate governance code or, alternatively, explain why they do not. We use this setting to consider why firms do not have an audit committee, what common explanations are provided and what firm characteristics are associated with the explanations.
Prior audit committee research has typically focused on firm characteristics associated with voluntary formation or voluntary best practice. We contribute to this literature by taking a 'mirror image' perspective of firms that do not have audit committees. Firms that choose to have an audit committee reflect the net benefits, whereas firms that do not have a committee reflect supply factors (firm size and board size).
Furthermore, regulators are likely to be more interested in firms that do not comply with best practice guidelines than those that do. Of major interest is whether the COE regime functions as intended with regard to audit committees, or if the provided explanations are unrelated pretexts to avoid non-compliance with best practice corporate governance.
First, we describe the explanations provided for not having an audit committee, and find that firm size-and board size-related explanations are the most common. We then examine the firm characteristics associated with each type of explanation. There is consistent evidence that firm size, board size and complexity explanations are used by firms with fewer total assets, smaller boards and those with less complex financial affairs in terms of agency costs related to leverage. We interpret these results as showing that the COE regime is not being misused by firms using unrelated pretexts to avoid following corporate governance best practice in regard to audit committees. This also contrasts with the revised guidance which suggests that brief explanations are not informative (ASX CGC 2014). However, we suggest that the ASX CGC requires firms to provide more detail to less descriptive explanations, such as Efficiency, as the most recent version of the ASX CGC (2014) does not contain such a requirement.
The explanations are also associated with other demand and supply determinants of having an audit committee, such as Big 4 auditor use, firm performance and net cash flow from operations. These results should be of interest to regulators and policy makers, as we provide information about the functioning of the 'explain' part of a 'comply or explain' regime. Our results also suggest that a one-size-fits-all regime is not appropriate.
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Notes
1 A further change was the enactment of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act, known as CLERP 9, and the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards, both effective from 1 July 2004. 2 A third edition was issued in 2014. Our study not only documents the explanations given for non-compliance, and tests if the explanations are justified, it also comments on whether the revision made in ASX CGC (2014) was necessary or adequate. 3 As far as the authors are aware there are no publicly available results of monitoring the 'comply or explain' regime. 4 Hay et al. (2017) provide a review of the audit committee literature focusing on the Australian and New Zealand literature. 5 As discussed in the additional tests section, we also consider managerial ownership instead of distributed ownership. 6 Alternatively, audit committees may be more likely to encourage firms to follow industry best practice and hire a Big 4 audit firm. 7 Non-compliance has also been studied in other settings such as the Netherlands (Akkermans et al. 2007 ) and Germany (Talaulicar and Werder 2008 
